Lloyd George at War, 1916–1918
George H. Cassar

Pub Date: July 2011
Binding: Paperback
Price: £25 / $40
ISBN: 9780857283924

Extent: 464 pages
Size: 229 x 152mm / 9 x 6
Illustrations: 18+ images

Description
Refutes the traditional view that Lloyd George was the person most responsible for winning the Great War.

‘Cassar’s views cannot be lightly set aside. [...] His case against Lloyd George is well made [...] Measured and reasonable [...] A fine scholarly study, founded on deep research and knowledge [...] It is of more than just historical interest [...] At a time when the UK’s strategy, or lack of it, is receiving considerable attention, Cassar’s careful study of how and why things went wrong is worth more than a passing glance.’ —Gary Sheffield, ’The RUSI Journal’

Lloyd George at War, 1916–1918 provides a much needed re-evaluation of this charismatic prime minister’s wartime leadership. Calling on a wide range of primary sources and focussing on Lloyd George’s role in the war cabinet, Cassar compellingly argues that George’s reputation as the “man who won the war” was wholly unmerited. Instead Cassar shows that Lloyd George’s heavy handed leadership was often detrimental to the Allied cause. From his wholehearted support for the disastrous Nivelle offensive, to his pursuit of a peripheral strategy that diverted troops away from the critical theatre of war on the Western Front, Cassar shows that Lloyd George consistently bucked the advice of his generals in preference for ineffectual and dangerous military strategies. Cassar’s approach also differs from that of other studies of Lloyd George by adopting a thematic approach in preference to a chronological narrative, thereby allowing a closer evaluation of Lloyd George’s handling of complex issues.

Readership: Historians, researchers and students of the First World War and British political history.

Contents
Illustrations; Maps; Preface; Acknowledgements; Abbreviations; Setting the Stage; Part I: The Home Front; The Search for a Manpower Policy; The Challenge of Labor; Controlling Shipping and Food; Part II: Strategy and the War; The First Attempt at a Unified Command; Facing the Submarine Menace; Prelude to Catastrophe; The Horror of Passchendaele; The Peripheral War; The Quest for a Negotiated Peace; The Creation of the Supreme War Council; The Plans for 1918; Before the Storm; Crisis on the Western Front; The Maurice Affair; The Origins of Intervention in Russia; The German Advance Halted; The Turn of the Tide; The Road to the Armistice; Conclusion; Bibliography

About the Author
George H. Cassar is Professor of Military and Modern European History at Eastern Michigan University and a leading authority on Britain at war.